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ABSTRACT
Increasingly over the past six decades, space exploration and
technology have revolutionized the world we live in. The landscape in outer space has continued to evolve rapidly, presenting
new challenges for a much slower moving legal framework as
well as for peaceful uses of space more generally. In particular,
space debris has emerged as a pressing global threat. In response, states have shifted towards a more informal two-pronged
approach to outer space, as reflected by non-binding instruments adopted by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), along with the
development of technologies that aim to provide practical solutions to space debris concerns. Taking into account these strategies, this Article first undertakes a review of various complexities
facing the existing regulatory framework regarding the environment of space with a focus on dual-use technologies. The Article
then demonstrates how Science and Technology Studies (STS)
perspectives may offer frameworks and approaches that allow legal scholars to approach highly networked and entangled questions in ways that offer new paths forward while also facilitating
technical legal analysis. By doing this, we hope to emphasize
that a more multi-disciplinary perspective regarding the complexities and challenges associated with increasing levels of
space activities is both warranted and constructive.
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INTRODUCTION

O

VER THE PAST DECADES, space exploration and technology have revolutionized the world we live in. Along with
the initial focus on military and scientific developments, the
uses of outer space have multiplied as space has become increasingly accessible to a wide range of actors, such that it now plays
an essential role in everyday human activities, from agriculture
to finance to communications and beyond.1
Developments in outer space have also contributed to shaping—and in turn have been shaped by—political conceptions
and international relations. Particularly striking is the context in
which the first significant breakthroughs in space technology occurred: a climate of fierce competition and near confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union, giving rise to
what became known as the (first) “space race.”2
1 See generally, WORLD ECON. F., SIX WAYS SPACE TECHNOLOGIES BENEFIT LIFE ON
EARTH (2020), https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GFC_Six_ways_space_
technologies_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ7H-HJK5].
2 See Steven Freeland, What Sort of Space “Race” Should We be Pursuing?, AUSTL.
INST. INT’L AFFS. (Dec. 15, 2021), https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/austra-
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This perception of outer space as a state-dominated competitive arena was at the heart of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, considered by many as the “constitution” of international space
law.3 This landmark Treaty, which codified various fundamental
principles, was followed in relatively quick succession by four
more space treaties.4
Despite this early regulatory evolution, the landscape in outer
space has continued to evolve rapidly, presenting new challenges for a much slower moving legal framework. Notably,
space debris has emerged as a pressing global threat, warranting
a coordinated response at the international level.5 Yet, the current binding international framework as set out in these treaties
largely appears unequipped to deal with the increasing proliferation of space debris despite widespread acknowledgement of
the hazards it creates.6
In response, states have shifted towards a more informal (at
least from a legal sense) two-pronged approach to outer space,
as reflected by non-binding instruments adopted by the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS), along with the development of technologies that
aim to provide practical solutions to space debris concerns.7
lianoutlook/what-sort-space-race-should-we-be-pursuing/ [https://perma.cc/
7P58-5G39] (discussing the various “space races” that have taken place).
3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for
signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer
Space Treaty]; see also Jill Stuart, The Outer Space Treaty Has Been Remarkably Successful – but Is It Fit for the Modern Age?, CONVERSATION (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:59 AM),
https://theconversation.com/the-outer-space-treaty-has-been-remarkably-successful-but-is-it-fit-for-the-modern-age-71381 [https://perma.cc/UDD6-D8E5].
4 See Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672
U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389, 962 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]; Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, adopted Nov. 12, 1974, 28
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]; Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
adopted Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
5 Paul B. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 475, 476–77
(2018).
6 See id. at 477.
7 See Steven Freeland, For Better or for Worse? The Use of ‘Soft Law’ Within the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, 36 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 409, 438–39
(2011).
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Taking into account these strategies, this Article focuses on
how the international community has responded to the issue of
space debris, utilizing elements of a Science and Technology
Studies (STS) approach, in order to evaluate the efficacy of the
prevailing legal-centric strategy. By doing this, we hope to emphasize that a more multi-disciplinary perspective regarding the
complexities and challenges associated with increasing levels of
space activities is both warranted and constructive.
Before this examination, however, we will undertake a review
of the problems facing the existing regulatory framework regarding the environment of space, in particular those arising
from the problem of space debris.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF SPACE DEBRIS

Space debris principally comprises those space objects (satellites) that have reached their end of life; various launch stages
(for example, rocket bodies and upper stages of launch vehicles); and the remnants of space objects from explosions, conjunctions, or deliberate destruction, as well as other items that
are deliberately or accidentally released during a space mission.
While there is as yet no universally accepted or legally binding
definition of orbital space debris, COPUOS has developed a definition, incorporating debris both in Earth orbit but also in the
process of “de-orbiting,” as follows: “[A]ll man-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or reentering the atmosphere, that are non-functional.”8 This definition itself comes from various non-binding instruments developed through COPUOS dealing specifically with space debris
mitigation (as discussed in more detail below).9
According to estimates by the European Space Agency, as of
April 4, 2022, there were in Earth’s orbit more than 130 million
pieces of debris smaller than 1 centimeter, about 1,000,000
pieces of debris 1–10 centimeters in length, and around 36,500
of pieces larger than 10 centimeters.10 The total mass of all
8 U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 1 (2010), https://
www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QJZ4L63].
9 See infra Section III.B.
10 Space Debris by the Numbers, EUR. SPACE AGENCY https://www.esa.int/
Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers [https://perma.
cc/J78M-LMAC] (Aug. 11, 2022).
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space objects—a large proportion of which is in the form of
space debris—is greater than 9,900 tons.11
Given the orbital velocity of even the smallest piece of debris,
any collision with another space object would almost certainly
result in damage to, or destruction of, that object and the production of further pieces of debris.12 This increases the possibility of what has been termed the “Kessler Syndrome,”13 and
ultimately a tragedy of the commons in outer space.14
Space debris is a major area for environmental concern, and
it clearly also impacts human safety. For example, on March 12,
2009, the three astronauts aboard the International Space Station (ISS), Americans Mike Fincke and Sandra Magnus, and
Russian Yury Lonchakov, were forced to evacuate the main station and remain in the ISS escape vehicle for nine minutes,
while a piece of debris about thirteen centimeters in length
passed by.15 Had the debris hit and pierced the ISS, it is possible
that a fatal loss of air pressure could have ensued. Such contingency measures have been instituted on the ISS on other
occasions.16
Only one month before the March 2009 ISS incident, an operational American commercial satellite (Iridium 33) and an inactive Russian communications satellite (Cosmos 2251) collided
approximately 790 kilometers above the Earth, resulting in the
total destruction of both.17 This was the first time that two intact
Id.
DONALD J. KESSLER ET AL., LIMITING FUTURE COLLISION RISK TO SPACECRAFT:
AN ASSESSMENT OF NASA’S METEOROID AND ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAMS 1 (2011).
13 See Mike Wall, Kessler Syndrome and the Space Debris Problem, SPACE.COM (Nov.
15, 2021), https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris [https://
perma.cc/Y55C-YF5T].
14 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1243–44 (1968) (discussing the tragedy of the commons in the context of mankind overpopulating Earth); see also Steven Freeland, Common Heritage, Not Common Law: How International Law Will Regulate Proposals to Exploit Space Resources, 35
QUESTIONS INT’L L. 19, 33 (2017) (discussing the implications of the tragedy of
the commons for the use of outer space).
15 Maggie Mckee, Debris Threat Prompts Space Station Crew to Evacuate, NEW SCIENTIST (Mar. 12, 2009), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16755-debristhreat-prompts-space-station-crew-to-evacuate/ [https://perma.cc/5SH8-ZABA].
16 See, e.g., International Space Station Forced to Swerve to Avoid US Space Junk,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/dec/03/
international-space-station-forced-to-swerve-to-avoid-us-space-junk [https://
perma.cc/UB25-HZCF].
17 Brian Weeden, SECURE WORLD FOUND., 2009 IRIDIUM-COSMOS COLLISION
FACT SHEET (2010), https://swfound.org/media/6575/swf_iridium_cosmos_collision_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4CW-UN5Y].
11
12
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satellites collided, and the incident resulted in approximately
2,000 additional pieces of hazardous debris of four centimeters
or more being created, with the potential to cause additional
decades-long pollution in space.18
Adding to the complexity of the issue, in 2007 and 2008, both
China19 and the United States,20 respectively, proceeded to deliberately destroy their own satellites in space, thus causing additional space debris from the resultant explosions. More recently,
in March 2019, India21 also kinetically destroyed one of its own
satellites, as did Russia22 in late 2021.
Recent events have led to the United States committing in
April 2021 “not to conduct destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile testing,” seeking to establish this as “a new
international norm for responsible behavior in space.”23 This
commitment is part of a growing trend towards defining and
committing to non-binding norms intended to reduce collective
risk. Indeed, at the time that this article is being written, an
Open-Ended Working Group on “reducing space threats
through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours,”
which was established by the United Nations General Assembly,
was holding its first session in Geneva.24

18 Id.; see also Leonard David, Effects of Worst Satellite Breakups in History Still Felt
Today, SPACE.COM (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.space.com/19450-space-junkworst-events-anniversaries.html.
19 Carin Zissis, China’s Anti-Satellite Test, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Feb. 22,
2007, 10:37 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-anti-satellite-test
[https://perma.cc/B4K3-UJEP].
20 Jim Wolf, U.S. Satellite Shootdown Debris Said Gone from Space, REUTERS (Feb.
27, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-usa-china-idUSTRE51Q
2Q220090227 [https://perma.cc/ZVW2-4HPW].
21 Ashley J. Tellis, India’s ASAT Test: An Incomplete Success, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Apr. 15, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/
04/15/india-s-asat-test-incomplete-success-pub-78884 [https://perma.cc/J6SXU2SK].
22 Shannon Bugos, Russian ASAT Test Creates Massive Debris, ARMS CONTROL
ASS’N (Dec. 2021), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-12/news/russian-asattest-creates-massive-debris [https://perma.cc/X6JR-CJX2].
23 FACT SHEET: Vice President Harris Advances National Security Norms in Space,
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 18, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/ [https://perma.cc/34CE-YQG3].
24 Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS. (2022), https://meetings.unoda.org/meeting/oewg-space-2022/
[https://perma.cc/8MLL-6F5Z].
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THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE
TO SPACE DEBRIS
A.

THE TREATY FRAMEWORK

The Outer Space Treaty focuses primarily on issues of peaceful uses of outer space, regulation of space activities by non-governmental entities, and freedom of exploration and use.25 At
the same time, the legal regime has not prevented the development of military technology capable of being used in outer
space.26 While there are some restrictions, these were specified
in relatively general terms and were open to divergent interpretation as to what they did (and did not) prohibit.27 This is not
entirely surprising, since the development of space-related technology was, at least initially, inextricably related to military
strength—both in reality and to influence the perception of
others.28 It is no coincidence that, as noted, the first space race
“emerged at the height of the Cold War,” when both the United
States and the USSR strove to flex their respective technological
“muscles.”29 The early stages of human space activity coincided
with a period of quite considerable tension, with the possibility
of large-scale and potentially highly destructive military conflict
between the (space) superpowers of the time always lurking in
the background.30
Despite the possibilities for humankind that it would present,
the successful launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957 generated unease in
the West, since the technology was similar to that used for ballistic missiles.31 Within this highly sensitive context, it was crucial
that efforts were made by the international community to regulate this new frontier to avoid both a buildup of weapons and
armed conflict in space.32
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, pmbl.
See, e.g., DANA J. JOHNSON, SCOTT PAGE & C. BRYAN GABBARD, SPACE: EMERGING OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL POWER 5 (1998).
27 See Constraints Under International Law on Military Operations in, or in
Relation to, Outer Space During Armed Conflicts 2–5 (May 3, 2022) (Int’l
Comm. of the Red Cross, Working Paper), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/
constraints-under-international-law-military-space-operations.
28 Freeland, supra note 2.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See NATO Update: 1957, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., www.nato.int/docu/update/
50-59/1957e.htm [https://perma.cc/9M6D-Z3TC] (Nov. 6, 2001).
32 See id.
25
26
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When it comes to issues regarding the space environment, the
only mention of this in the Outer Space Treaty appears in Article IX, which concentrates primarily on the international principles of cooperation and mutual assistance, a duty to give “due
regard to the corresponding interests” of other state parties, and
the prevention of potentially harmful interference with other
states’ activities.33 It also provides inter alia that
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space,
including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, and conduct
exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination
and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where
necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.34

Article IX thus calls upon states to avoid the harmful contamination of outer space (forward contamination) and stresses the
necessity to also prevent backward contamination, which results
from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter into the Earth’s
environment.35
The semantics of this part of Article IX appear to reveal an
anthropocentric focus in relation to backward contamination of
the Earth’s environment, referring to “adverse changes” as the
threshold of harm in contrast to what might be regarded as a
narrower concept of “harmful contamination” required for forward contamination of outer space.36 The relevance and utility
of Article IX in addressing the issue of space debris is further
reduced by the fact that the Outer Space Treaty does not provide a definition of “harmful contamination,” and there is still
discussion amongst scholars as to whether or not space debris
must be regarded as falling within the scope of “harmful
contamination.”37
Indeed, some authors contend that, because the word “contamination” is used in common parlance with respect to chemical effluents, biological hazards, or radiation, the provisions of
Article IX should be construed as referring only to pollution
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX.
Id.
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 See PETER STUBBE, STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SPACE DEBRIS: A LEGAL STUDY
OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLLUTING THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT AND LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE DEBRIS 155 (2018) (discussing the notion of “harmful
contamination” in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty and its scope regarding
space debris).
33
34
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arising from the release of such contaminants in outer space,
thus not encompassing space debris.38
The requirement to conduct space activities within the context of “due regard” to the corresponding interests of other
spacefaring states39 (and presumably also those private entities
within their jurisdiction and supervision) is an important concept. The so-called due regard principle serves to introduce an
objective element into the process of consideration as to
whether a particular activity should be contemplated.40
The notion of giving due regard to the interests of others, to
safety, or to both is also an element in the international treaty
framework for air activities41 and the law of the sea.42 Its inclusion in Article IX imposes a restriction on unfettered exploration and use of outer space by requiring a due-diligence
assessment of the potential impacts a particular activity may have
on the activities undertaken by others.43 While the due regard
principle has not been resorted to in any formal legal proceedings, its application would likely be considered on a case-by-case
basis and also requires a consideration of what might constitute
a “corresponding” interest.44
Of the remaining four treaties, only the Liability Convention
contains provisions that are relevant in the context of space deb38 See, e.g., Vishakha Gupta, Critique of the International Law on Protection of the
Outer Space Environment, 14 ASTROPOLITICS 20, 21 (2016); Jinyuan Su, Control over
Activities Harmful to the Environment, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 80
(Ram S. Jakhu & Paul Stephen Dempsey eds., 2017).
39 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX.
40 See id.
41 See Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3(d), Dec. 7, 1994, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention] (“The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.”).
42 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87.2, Dec. 10,
1982, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]
(“These freedoms [of the high seas] shall be exercised by all States with due
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with
respect to activities in the Area.”).
43 See, e.g., Giulia Pavesi, Legal Consequences of Environmental Pollution in Outer
Space, in 13 A FRESH VIEW ON THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 15, 22 (Annette Froehlich
ed., 2018), https://elib.dlr.de/132311/1/AFreshView_on_OuterSpaceTreat_
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8APC-YC3Y].
44 See John Goehring, The Russian ASAT Test Caps a Bad Year for the Due Regard
Principle in Space, JUST SEC. (Jan. 12, 2022) (detailing how the due regard principle is rarely if ever formally invoked by states in the outer space context).
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ris.45 The Liability Convention does not address the issue of
space environment and debris as such, but it provides some indications regarding liability for damage caused by space objects,
which are defined as “component parts of a space object as well
as its launch vehicle and parts thereof” for the purposes of the
Convention.46 It is thus relevant in the event of damage caused
by space debris.47 Of course, in this regard, it is only relevant
after the event and is not directly a preventative mechanism,
apart from any deterrence value that it might have.
One should also note that the Moon Agreement establishes a
heightened protection of the space environment and calls for
the preservation of its existing balance.48 With that said, its
seemingly broad applicability is limited due to the fact that it has
thus far attracted only eighteen ratifications,49 with none by any
nation that might be referred to as a major spacefaring nation.50
That is not to deny, however, that this instrument is a part of the
international space law treaty framework and sets out binding
rights and obligations for those eighteen states parties vis-à-vis
themselves in accordance with the general principles underlying
all treaties.51
45 See Liability Convention, supra note 4, arts. II–III; see also Steven Freeland &
Annie Handmer, It’s Not How Big Your Laser Is, It’s How You Use It: Space Law Is an
Important Part of the Fight Against Space Debris, CONVERSATION (Apr. 14, 2021, 4:08
PM), https://theconversation.com/its-not-how-big-your-laser-is-its-how-you-use-itspace-law-is-an-important-part-of-the-fight-against-space-debris-158790 [https://
perma.cc/C8UV-XZRE].
46 Liability Convention, supra note 4, art. I(d).
47 See id.
48 See Moon Agreement, supra note 4, art. 7.
49 The parties to the Moon Agreement as of May 2022 are Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, the
Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXIV-2&chapter=24&clang=_en (Jan. 9, 2022).
50 Most people agree that one provision in particular gave rise to reluctance on
the part of many spacefaring nations to adhere to the Moon Agreement: Article
11 states that natural resources in outer space are the “common heritage of mankind” and envisages a future regulatory regime for the exploitation of space resources through the rational management of those resources as well as the
equitable sharing of benefits derived from them. See Moon Agreement, supra
note 4, art. 11. For a more detailed analysis of the Moon Agreement, see Steven
Freeland et al., The Moon Agreement, in 2 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW
325–426 (Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 2013).
51 See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (setting out principles generally
applicable to treaties).
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However, it is true to assert that none of these binding treaty
instruments provide a satisfactory framework to effectively tackle
the issue of the creation and multiplication of space debris, and
to coordinate actions in this regard.
1.

Non-Binding “Legal” Instruments

As noted, space debris and their cascading effects represent
one of the greatest challenges for the long-term sustainability of
space activities.52 In light of the growing threat of space debris,
and in the absence of any satisfactory binding regulation at the
international level to address the issue, experts and state representatives have gathered in various international and regional
fora to discuss space debris mitigation and outer space activities
in general.53 This has led to the development of several nonbinding instruments, through which states voluntarily accept to
comply with certain fundamental rules and standards in order
to ensure the continuity of space activities in the future.54
Their non-binding terms envisage implementation at the
national level via national or agency policies and policymakers
in the hope that this might ultimately contribute to the formation of a due-diligence—or indeed, due regard—standard, if international practice becomes sufficiently widespread and
representative.55
See discussion supra Part II.
See, e.g., Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Annotated Provisional
Agenda of the Legal Subcomm. for Its Sixty-First Session, para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/C.2/L.319 (2022), https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2022/aac_105c_2l/aac_105c_2l_319_0_html/AC105_C2_L319E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KE69-HKNB].
54 See, e.g., European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation § 2.1–.2
(June 28, 2004), https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/2004B5-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/44WJ-6J7V] (Contributions from various European
space agencies); see also Eur. Space Agency [ESA], Space Debris Mitigation for Agency
Projects 3 (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&
esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjJ6Zu4ncz4AhXiH0QIHVGtBLAQFnoECAYQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.iadc-home.org%2Fdocuments_public%2F
file_down%2Fid%2F4150&usg=AOvVaw2tIGmo5CJXozERqy_jrH_w [https://
perma.cc/CFQ5-PNF9]; Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Environmental Protection of
the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit, Recommendation ITU-R S.1003-2 (Dec. 2010),
https://www.itu.int/dms_pubrec/itu-r/rec/s/R-REC-S.1003-2-201012-I!!PDFE.pdf. [https://perma.cc/322H-UCWM].
55 See European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation, supra note 54,
§ 2.1–.2.
52
53
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The main non-legally binding instruments are the 2002 IADC
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines56 and the 2007 Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines as adopted by COPUOS and endorsed by
the United Nations General Assembly.57 More recently, in June
2019, COPUOS adopted a number of Long-Term Sustainability
Guidelines that will also be relevant to the issue of space debris
mitigation.58
2.

IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines

Even before the incidents referred to above, it has been recognized that the continuous generation of additional space debris, whether by accident, decay, or deliberate action, causes an
ever-increasing collision hazard for human-made satellites.59 For
this reason, it was decided in 1993 to establish among interested
space agencies an Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee (IADC), which is “an international forum of governmental bodies for the coordination of activities related to the
issues of man-made and natural debris in space.”60 According to
its terms of reference, “[t]he primary purpose of the IADC is to
exchange information on space debris research activities between members, to facilitate opportunities for cooperation in
space debris research, to review the progress of ongoing cooperative activities and to identify debris mitigation options.”61
In accordance with its mandate, the IADC discussed ways in
which the issue of space debris might be addressed. After several
years of discussion and debate, the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (IADC Guidelines)62 “were formally adopted [by
consensus] in October 2002 during the Second World Space
56 See Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm. [IADC], IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01 (Sept. 2007), https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/IADC-2002-01-IADC-Space_Debris-GuidelinesRevision1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NBT-QADL].
57 G.A. Res. 62/217, (Dec. 22, 2007).
58 See U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (2021), https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/
2021/stspace/stspace79_0_html/st_space79E.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A635T6J].
59 See IADC, supra note 56, at 4.
60 Id. at 3.
61 IADC, Terms of Reference, at 7, IADC-93-01 (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.iadchome.org/terms_reference [https://perma.cc/4SNV-QG54].
62 IADC, supra note 56.
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Congress in Houston, Texas.”63 They describe then-existing
practices that had been identified and evaluated for their impact on limiting the generation of space debris in the
environment.64
B.

SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES

OF

COPUOS65

The IADC presented its Debris Mitigation Guidelines to the
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) of COPUOS,
which had been considering the issue of space debris since
1994.66 The STSC established a Working Group to develop a set
of guidelines based on the IADC standards, and the IADC Debris Mitigation Guidelines thus served as a baseline for the eventual development of the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of
COPUOS in 2007.67
As noted above, in its Resolution 62/217, the United Nations
General Assembly endorsed the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines as adopted by the STSC and agreed that these voluntary
guidelines for the mitigation of space debris reflected the existing practices as developed by a number of national and international organizations.68
The Guidelines recognize two broad categories of space debris mitigation measures:
(a) “those that curtail the generation of potentially harmful
space debris in the near term . . . the curtailment of the production of mission-related space debris and the avoidance of breakups,” and (b) “those that limit their generation over the longer
term . . . end-of-life procedures that remove decommissioned
spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages from regions populated by operational spacecraft.”69
The seven Guidelines remain at a generalized level and encourage, on a voluntary basis, actions that would:
[(a)] Limit debris released during normal operations[;]
[(b)] Minimize the potential for break-ups during operational
phases[;]
63 Nicholas L. Johnson, Recent Developments in Space Debris Mitigation Policy and
Practices, NASA, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20060052514 [https://
perma.cc/5DLN-Q72P] (Sept. 7, 2013).
64 IADC, supra note 56, at 7–10.
65 U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., supra note 58.
66 Id. at iii–iv.
67 Id. at iv.
68 See G.A. Res. 62/217, supra note 57, paras. 1, 27.
69 U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., supra note 58, at 1.
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[(c)] Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit[;]
[(d)] Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful
activities[;]
[(e)] Minimize potential for post-mission break-ups resulting
from stored energy[;]
[(f)] Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch
vehicle orbital stages in the Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) region after
the end of their mission[; and]
[(g)] Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and
launch vehicle orbital stages with the geosynchronous Earth orbit
(GEO) region after the end of their mission.70

These Guidelines are broad and non-specific, and although
they are becoming more widely accepted,71 they do not provide
comprehensive standards covering all aspects of the space debris
question. They do not, for example, address issues such as environmental protection and liability, or the politically charged
question of the deliberate destruction of space objects, merely
stating that it “should be avoided.”72 This is a particularly contentious matter given the fundamental principle of free use and
exploration of outer space, enshrined in Article I of the Outer
Space Treaty.73
More fundamentally, it can be observed that the guidelines
reflect an anthropocentric approach and are still very much
structured around ideas of state sovereignty and individualism.74
They focus on the standards that should be implemented in order to prevent damage to spacecraft and ensure access to outer
space in the future, and do not touch upon environmental protection as such.75 Moreover, despite the global consequences of
pollution of the space environment and the potential for individual actions to impact the situation, the guidelines fail to promote a coordinated approach to the issue of space debris. The
recommendations are focused on technical standards and are
directed to COPUOS member states to implement on a volunId. at 2–4.
See U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., Compendium of Space Debris Mitigation
Standards Adopted by States and International Organizations, https://www.unoosa.
org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-debris/compendium.html#:~:text=the%20
compendium%20of%20space%20debris,Subcommittee%20on%20%22General
%20exchange%20of [https://perma.cc/SEH6-UU2V].
72 U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., supra note 8, at 3.
73 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. I.
74 See U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., supra note 8, at 2.
75 See id. at 2–4.
70
71
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tary basis, and thus relate to situations when they are undertaking space activities “individually.”76
Research by member states and international organizations in
the area of space debris should continue in a spirit of international cooperation to maximize the benefits of space debris mitigation initiatives. This document will be reviewed and may be
revised, as warranted, in light of new findings. Mention of cooperation is only made once in the Guidelines, in a rather abstract
and vague section regarding “Updates.”77 The global character
of the issue of space debris and the interconnectedness of states’
actions thus seem to be lacking in COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines.
C.

GUIDELINES

LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY
ACTIVITIES OF COPUOS

FOR THE

SPACE

OF

OUTER

During its 62nd session in June 2019, COPUOS adopted the
Preamble and 21 Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of
Outer Space Activities (Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines).78
These provide guidance on policy and a regulatory framework
for space activities; safety of space operations; international cooperation, capacity-building, and awareness; and scientific and
technical research and development.79
Among the specific issues addressed by the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines, the problem of space debris is a major
element.80 Indeed, most of the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines are relevant to the issue of space debris, with the following
Guidelines having specific relevance:
[(a)] Guideline A.1 [–] Adopt, revise and amend, as necessary,
national regulatory frameworks for outer space activities[;]
[(b)] Guideline A.2 [–] Consider a number of elements when
developing, revising or amending, as necessary, national regulatory frameworks for outer space activities[;]
[(c)] Guideline B.1 [–] Provide updated contact information
and share information on space objects and orbital events[;]
[(d)] Guideline B.2 [–] Improve accuracy of orbital data on
space objects and enhance the practice and utility of sharing orbital information on space objects[;]
See id.
See id. at 4.
78 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Sci. & Tech.
Subcomm. on its Fifty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.366 (2019).
79 Id. at 3.
80 See id. at 1.
76
77
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[(e)] Guideline B.3 [–] Promote the collection, sharing and dissemination of space debris monitoring information[;]
[(f)] Guideline B.8 [–] Design and operation of space objects
regardless of their physical and operational characteristics[;]
[(g)] Guideline B.9 [–] Take measures to address risks associated
with the uncontrolled reentry of space objects[; and]
[(h)] Guideline D.2 [–] Investigate and consider new measures
to manage the space debris population in the long term.81

While the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines are voluntary
and non-binding, the Preamble calls upon states to do the
following:
States . . . should voluntarily take measures, through their own
national or other applicable mechanisms, to ensure that the
guidelines are implemented to the greatest extent feasible and
practicable, in accordance with their respective needs, conditions
and capabilities, and with their existing obligations under applicable international law, including the provisions of applicable
United Nations treaties and principles on outer space.82

It remains to be seen the extent to which these practical suggestions are, indeed, implemented into binding national law.
Any national implementation of measures directed towards
space debris mitigation and remediation should address the relevant elements of each of the Guidelines referred to above. This
is a desirable but ultimately complex task.
That said, amongst other things, we consider that the elements contained in the 2019 Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines may support the development of solutions regarding space
debris remediation. Remediation is widely believed to be an essential element in order to properly address the growing population of space debris and thus ensure the long-term
sustainability of outer space.83 This was very clearly emphasized
in a 2012 Report of the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) to COPUOS, when it stated
the following:
These mitigation guidelines focus on the mitigation (or reduction) of the rate at which new pieces of space debris are generated. However, in view of the massive amount of debris already in
existence in Earth orbit, growing consensus among experts sugId. at 5–6, 10–11, 15–16, 20.
Id. at 3.
83 See, e.g., J.-C. LIOU ET AL., STABILITY OF THE FUTURE LEO ENVIRONMENT – AN
IADC COMPARATIVE STUDY § 5 (2013), https://conference.sdo.esoc.esa.int/proceedings/sdc6/paper/199/sdc6-paper199.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XG8-C8HC].
81
82
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gests that an active process for the removal of existing debris
from space and for on-orbit servicing of satellites is required, in
addition to the mitigation efforts.84

Overall, while the regulatory framework established through
COPUOS’s process relating to issues of the mitigation and
remediation of orbital space debris does contain important elements relating to best practice notions, it is neither entirely
comprehensive nor binding.85 Given the various significant issues addressed earlier relating to the problems caused by proliferating space debris, we regard it as useful to also consider other
measures that have been developed and will now proceed to
consider those through the lens of a STS approach.
IV.

A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES APPROACH
TO DEBRIS-RELATED ISSUES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW

Having briefly canvassed the law and law-related approaches
to the problems associated with space debris, we now take a different lens with which to analyze the situation—an STS assessment of the issues. As a preliminary question, one might ask a
simple question: what does STS have to do with international
space law? The answer to this will, it is hoped, becomes clear by
the conclusion of this Article. In the following analysis, we present some concepts in STS and demonstrate how alternate ways
of thinking about the relationship between technology and society may lead to new paths forward for intractable legal challenges such as addressing the proliferation of space debris.
There are many different ways of conceptualizing the interface (or, indeed, problematizing the notion of a discernible or
fixed interface at all) between technology and social systems.86
Perhaps the most central tenet of contemporary STS approaches is to recognize that science is always, and has always
84 Ram Jakhu, Chair, IASS Legal & Regul. Comm., Presentation to the 49th
Session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Active Debris Removal – An Essential Mechanism for
Ensuring the Safety and Sustainability of Outer Space 5 (2012), https://
www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2012/tech-21E.pdf [https://perma.cc/D877ZD9U] (alteration in original).
85 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 78, at 1, 3, 5–21.
86 See generally ULRIKE FELT, HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES
(Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Petersen & Trevor Pinch eds., 1995)
(discussing an overview of common STS methodologies).
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been, entangled with political and social forces.87 This contention causes particular discomfort in the space sector, where Cold
War interests consistently insisted that science was both apolitical and amoral as a matter of national policy.88
The appeal to reason and method that science promised was a
useful tool for diffusing political heat, while also producing
knowledge and technology to bolster power.89 Such an approach also had ethical implications. Scientists, we are led to
believe, are capable of seeking out hard facts and knowledge
independent of their political milieu. Such an approach was politically beneficial; in the same way that it made it easier to overlook the deaths of the enslaved workers that Wernher von Braun
oversaw at Dora-Mittelbau concentration camp,90 on the basis
that the knowledge itself that he promised, and delivered, to the
western world was amoral, it also made it simpler to transmute
the destructive V2 rocket into the inspirational Saturn V.91
The core space treaties arose from a collective understanding
that, even if we could believe that science and technology were
amoral and apolitical, their development was not without practical consequence.92 Indeed, when, in 1967, “diplomats came together during the height of Cold War brinksmanship to
conclude the Outer Space Treaty,”93 they “initiated the most significant principle of law for enhancing the common interest of
all in space in order to thwart potential colonization ambitions
in space.”94 By declaring that outer space “is not subject to national appropriation” by any means, the Treaty established a
See AUDRA J. WOLFE, FREEDOM’S LABORATORY: THE COLD WAR STRUGGLE FOR
SOUL OF SCIENCE 2 (2018).
88 See, e.g., David Tyfield, A Cultural Political Economy of Research and Innovation
in an Age of Crisis, 50 MINERVA 149, 154 (2012).
89 Id.
90 See MICHAEL J. NEUFELD, VON BRAUN: DREAMER OF SPACE, ENGINEER OF WAR
176 (2007); Dora-Mittelbau: Overview, HOLOCAUST ENCYC., U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L
MUSEUM, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/dora-mittelbauoverview.
91 See generally NEUFELD, supra note 90, at 476–77; ROGER D. LAUNIUS, REACHING
FOR THE MOON: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SPACE RACE 118 (2019) (discussing
those aspects of the space race involving Von Braun).
92 See Rescue Agreement, supra note 4; Liability Convention, supra note 4; Registration Convention, supra note 4; Moon Agreement, supra note 4.
93 Kuan-Wei Chen, Ram S. Jakhu & Steven Freeland, Space Exploration Should
Aim for Peace, Collaboration and Co-operation, Not War and Competition, CONVERSATION (Oct. 11, 2021, 9:11 AM), https://theconversation.com/space-explorationshould-aim-for-peace-collaboration-and-co-operation-not-war-and-competition169317 [https://perma.cc/FGZ6-STTJ].
94 Id.
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governance system that placed mutual understanding and
friendly relations ahead of individual gain.95
Today, 111 countries are parties to the Outer Space Treaty.96
They undertake to uphold the “common interest” of all humanity to explore and use outer space for “peaceful purposes.”97 The
Treaty affirms that outer space is “free for exploration and use
by all States . . . on a basis of equality and in accordance with
international law.”98 In undertaking such activities, however,
states are, as discussed above, required to do so “with due regard
to the corresponding interests” of other states.99
In essence politics and pragmatism stepped in, and even
though they were protagonists in an all-encompassing diplomatic (and physical) war, the major spacefaring states (supported by the remainder of the international community)
negotiated the extent to which each was willing to give up certain freedoms in exchange for the collective management of
risk.100
While that risk might seem more abstract to us in 2022,101 it
was part of the fabric of the lives of those who wrote the treaties.
They had lived through World War II in all of its destruction
and loss, and were experiencing a time of immense technological change and excitement.102 Despite some imperfections, their
Treaty, which was predicated on a commitment to the idea that
science was apolitical (or, at the very least, civil) contributed to a
period of diplomacy, cooperation, (pragmatic) friendship, and
advancement in the space sciences.103 But as politically useful as
Id. (quoting Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. II).
Id.
97 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, pmbl.
98 Id. art. I.
99 Id. art. IX.
100 See generally ALBERT K. LAI, THE COLD WAR, THE SPACE RACE, AND THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE: SPACE FOR PEACE 86–99 (2021).
101 But see Holly Ellyatt, Russian Forces Invade Ukraine, CNBC, https://
www.cnbc.com/2022/02/24/russian-forces-invade-ukraine.html [https://
perma.cc/3BXL-93BZ] (Feb. 24, 2022, 11:38 AM) (noting that this might not be
entirely true at the moment since this Article is being written at a very tense
geopolitical time with an ongoing war in Ukraine).
102 See, e.g., Kristen D. Burton, The Scientific and Technological Advances of World
War II, NAT’L WW II MUSEUM, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/scientific-and-technological-advances-world-war-ii [https://perma.cc/9PCV8CFD].
103 See LAI, supra note 100, at 93, 95–97; Stephen Buono, Merely a ‘Scrap of Paper’? The Outer Space Treaty in Historical Perspective, 31 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT
350, 354 (2020).
95
96
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the idea of objectivity and amorality of “fact” might be, does the
idea still serve a pragmatic purpose?
Social constructivist approaches rose in prevalence in the field
of STS during the 1970s, a theoretical and practical rejoinder to
realist angles.104 Realism (very simply, the idea that there is a
“real world,” and that science describes the truth of that reality
in increasingly more accurate ways)105 did not readily address
the social and cultural context within which knowledge was
formed, distributed, and situated.106
According to scholars employing a social constructivism lens,
the production of knowledge is necessarily a socially mediated
process.107 They argue that science does not directly translate
objective reality (nature) into objective truth (facts).108 The production of science is inevitably social—whether it is in the laboratory where a version of nature is produced and interrogated,
or through the use of instruments such as telescopes that, rather
than being direct mirrors of nature, produce a mediated image
that is given meaning and significance through human acts.109
Having reframed science as a product of social interactions,
STS scholars have spent decades sifting through it to form a
more complete understanding of how, precisely, society and
technology interact with one another.110
The 1980s saw a cluster of approaches to understanding society and its relationship to technology. Historian John Ellis’s
1986 book, The Social History of the Machine Gun, provides a broad
brushstroke overview of the implementation (or lack thereof) of
machine gun technologies and the social reasons for their adop104 SERGIO SISMONDO, AN INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIEs
51–52 (2004).
105 Id. at 52.
106 Everett Mendelsohn, The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge, in 1 THE
SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 3, 6 (Everett Mendelsohn, Peter
Weingart & Richard Whitley eds., 1977).
107 See SISMONDO, supra note 104, at 55.
108 See id.
109 See id.; KARIN KNORR-CETINA, THE MANUFACTURE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY
ON THE CONSTRUCTIVIST AND CONTEXTUAL NATURE OF SCIENCE 4 (1981); see also
Catherine Wilson, Instruments and Ideologies: The Social Construction of Knowledge
and Its Critics, 33 AM. PHIL. Q. 167, 171 (1996) (discussing optical instruments in
the context of constructing scientific knowledge).
110 See SISMONDO, supra note 104, at 10; see also Annie Handmer, Making a Success of ‘Failure’: A Science Studies Analysis of PILOT and SERC in the Context of
Australian Space Science 15–16, (Sept. 30, 2021) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney), https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/handle/2123/27383/
handmer_ag_thesis.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.
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tion and resistance in particular contexts.111 The book argues
that changes in military technology are inseparably intertwined
with the social fabric of the cultures within which they were
adopted.112 On Ellis’s view, it would be futile to try to understand technology without also understanding how it is actively
shaped by social networks, and it would be equally foolish to try
to study social networks without reference to the technologies
around which they arrange themselves.113 He writes:
The history of technology is part and parcel of social history in
general. The same is equally true of military history, far too long
regarded as a simple matter of tactics and technical differentials.
Military history too can only be understood against the wider social background. For as soon as one begins to discuss war and
military organisation without due regard to the whole social process, one is in danger of coming to regard it as a constant, an
inevitable feature of international behaviour. In other words, if
one is unable to regard war as a function of particular forms of
social and political organisation and particular stages of historical development, one will not be able to conceive of even the
possibility of a world without war.114

Two things stand out from Ellis’s call to action. The first is the
use of the phrase “due regard,” which coincidentally also appears in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty.115 The phrase has
been cast by space law practitioners as the “due regard principle,” and it introduces an objective “due diligence” concept that
is dependent on the particular circumstances.116
In Ellis’s use, due regard naturally means something different,
but there are nonetheless elements in common that we feel provide analytic value. STS compels us to consider a phenomenon
within its context, rather than in abstraction.117 To do so, it is
necessary to understand everything surrounding that phenomenon, from policy to culture to technology to economics (the
whole social process), and to examine how these factors intersect with each other as well as with the subject.
111 See JOHN ELLIS, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MACHINE GUN 1–9 (Pantheon
Books, Random House & Croom Helm Ltd. 1975).
112 Id. at 9.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 9–10.
115 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX.
116 See, e.g., Pavesi, supra note 43, at 22.
117 SISMONDO, supra note 104, at 55.
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Similarly, paying “due regard to the corresponding interests
of all other States Parties to the Treaty”118 in the pursuit of technological ends necessarily prompts a number of inherently social, rather than technological, questions: Who are the other
parties? What are their interests? Which of these interests might
fall within the qualification of “corresponding?” How much regard is due, and what practical form might it take? In our view,
the answer to this last question might also consider what the
consequences would be if the other parties perceive that the regard paid to their interests does not meet the benchmark of
what they feel is due, and the precedent that action of enforcing
their rights might set for future interpretations of Article IX.
Importantly, it is the process of enacting due regard and engaging actively in trying to answer these questions (requiring international cooperation and dialogue) that in itself constitutes a
large component of due regard. The due regard principle cannot be solved in isolation by lawyers.
The second aspect that stands out flows directly from this observation. Ellis insists that attention to the social process is essential, not just as a matter of academic interest but from a practical
standpoint.119 Because technology is so inseparable from society,
failure to question the inevitability of an outcome facilitates its
continuation.120 This is not quite the same as identifying a linear, one-way chain of causation (the belief that something is inevitable does not on its own guarantee that it will occur), but it
does highlight that the relationship society has with technology,
and the structures and institutions we form around it, are not
influenced by technology alone.
Indeed, social constructivist approaches to technology have
historically problematized technological determinism. In 1985,
Melvin Kranzberg, a leader in the field of the history of technology, presented his presidential address to the Society for the
History of Technology.121 In it, he argued that adopting a stance
of technological determinism (which he defines as the idea that
our society is shaped mainly by technology) on the basis that
technology has somehow “outrun human control” is a kind of
intellectual cliché.122 The resonances for the space industry,
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX.
See ELLIS, supra note 111, at 9–10.
120 Id.
121 Melvin Kranzberg, TECHNOLOGY AND HISTORY: “Kranzberg’s Laws”, in
27 TECH. & CULTURE 544 (1986).
122 Id. at 545.
118
119
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with its frequent assertions that technology necessarily outpaces
regulation, are clear.
At the same time, failure to regulate and reach agreements on
new challenges, given the extent to which terrestrial activities
are reliant on satellite infrastructure, presents a uniquely high
risk.123 Such challenges occupy precisely this awkward space because they have to do with emerging technologies and associate
emerging social and institutional structures (industry).
In our view, a core strength of our existing principles of international space law is that they do not attempt to restrict technologies: They instead regulate behaviors in two important ways.
First, they establish norms (abstract), and secondly, they arise
out of and sustain particular social structures—in this instance,
primarily COPUOS (practical). To effect societal change or influence the use of technology, a technologically deterministic
approach requires that we regulate technology itself. We believe
that a social constructivist lens, on the other hand, may offer
another way through regulation of the social process.
Kranzberg’s speech also summarized six principles for technology that are now famous (at least to a certain set of people)
as “Kranzberg’s Laws.”124 The first of these is probably the most
widely known—“technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it
neutral.”125 However, his fourth principle is more immediately
relevant and reads: “Although technology might be a prime element in many public issues, nontechnical factors take precedence in technology-policy decisions.”126 We suggest that a
technologically sensitive analysis of international space law—
what Kranzberg might call a “social instrument”127—is an essential task if we are to have any way of understanding how the rapidly developing technologies, along with other factors, challenge
its core principles.
It is possible to see one example of Kranzberg’s fourth law in
action in the international law-related efforts to regulate, reduce, and remove space debris as described above. Here, all of
the agreed guidelines have tended to focus on reducing the
quantity of debris in orbit by proposing standards for preventing
123 See Ahmad Alsharoa, Emna Zedini & Mohamed-Slim Alouini, Downlink Resource Allocations of Satellite–Airborne–Terrestrial Networks Integration, in 123 ADVANCES IN COMPUTERS 1, 8–9 (2021).
124 Id. at 545–60 (discussing Kranzberg’s six laws).
125 Id. at 545.
126 Id. at 550.
127 Id. at 553.
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break-ups, speeding up de-orbit, and avoiding collisions.128 However, they are also non-binding,129 and in order to achieve international consensus (a significant achievement), they are
consequently hazy on technical details. Precisely how compliance with the guidelines should be achieved by commercial entities at a national level is left for national governments to
legislate.
By way of example, in Australia, an application for a Launch
Permit under the Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 requires
that “an application for the grant of an Australian launch permit
must include a strategy for debris mitigation” and that “[t]he
strategy must address the matters prescribed by the rules for the
purposes of this subsection.”130 The Rules to the Act specify that
“[t]he strategy for debris mitigation in the application must be
based on an internationally recognised guideline or standard
for debris mitigation, and identify the guideline or standard being used.”131 They also state that “[t]he strategy must describe
any mitigation measures planned for orbital debris arising from
the proposed launch or launches (including from payloads)”
and provide an example of how to address the following:
(a) how debris may be limited during normal operations;
(b) how the potential for break-ups during operational phases
will be minimised;
(c) how the probability of accidental collision in orbit will be
limited;
(d) how the potential for post-mission break-ups as a result of
stored energy will be minimised; and
(e) how the long-term presence of payloads and launch vehicle
orbital stages in the low-earth orbit region or in geosynchronous
earth orbit will be limited after the end of the mission.132

Precisely how—the technical part of the problem—is left to
each applicant to solve in that applicant’s own way.
In many ways, this is a useful way of drafting regulation to deal
with a rapidly developing technological landscape. Arguably, law
should not purport to keep pace with this technological change
with respect to space, given that the developments are so rapid
and fluid. Today’s technology is often quite quickly rendered
128
129
130
131
132

IADC, supra note 56, at 7–10.
See id. at 3, 5.
Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 (Cth) s 34(2)–(3) (Austl.).
Space (Launches and Returns) (General) Rules 2019 (Cth) r 54(1) (Austl.).
Id. r 54(2).
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obsolete (or at least insufficient) in tomorrow’s world.133 Therefore, to assert that the legal framework is completely up-to-date
in every way is misleading and may even lead to complacency.
Conversely, to attempt to provide for every conceivable future
development might amount to seeking to regulate for the “unknown,” which brings with it another set of inherent risks.134
By asking applicants to adhere simply to “an internationally
recognised guideline or standard,”135 the legislation and accompanying regulations remain flexible, automatically updatingwithout-updating to any international changes in best practice.
Likewise, by identifying a non-exhaustive list of issues that might
be addressed in the plan, the rules push responsibility for identifying technological solutions onto the applicant, while leaving
the methods open for innovation.136 They also incentivize government and commercial entities alike to engage actively in the
formation of international standards, facilitating bottom-up regulatory participation. Nonetheless, they present a non-trivial
challenge to applicants in determining and applying best practices and innovations according to their best judgment.
V.

DEBRIS REMEDIATION THROUGH ACTIVE DEBRIS
REMOVAL

While adherence to mitigation guidelines can reduce the
proliferation of debris, the problem of what to do with existing
defunct objects in orbit remains. A variety of technological solutions, from robotic arms to adhesives, foam, harpoons, tethers,
nets, lassos, tentacles, and high-power lasers, have been mooted
(and even funded) to try to remove objects from orbit.137
This process is called Active Debris Removal (ADR).138 At this
stage, despite technological progress on concept development
and even controlled experimentation and testing, ADR has yet
to be successfully demonstrated on a real debris target in orDeclan Butler, Tomorrow’s World, 530 NATURE 398, 399 (2016).
See Steven Freeland, International Law and the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, in RISK AND THE REGULATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 82
(Mónika Ambrus, Rosemary Rayfuse & Wouton Werner eds., 2017).
135 Space (Launches and Returns) (General) Rules 2019 r 54(1).
136 See id.
137 See Minghe Shan, Jian Guo & Eberhard Gill, Review and Comparison of Active
Space Debris Capturing and Removal Methods, 80 PROGRESS AEROSPACE SCIS. 18,
19–22 (2016); Handmer, supra note 110, at 104.
138 See P.J. Blount, On-Orbit Servicing and Active Debris Removal: Legal Aspects, in
PROMOTING PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN SPACE LAWYERS AND ENGINEERS
179, 179–80 (Anja Nakarada Pecujlic & Matteo Tugnoli eds., 2019).
133
134
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bit.139 ADR presents significant technological challenges: Generally, the first step is proximity, then rendezvous, followed by
capture and disposal, which may involve the release or the “sacrifice” of the debris-removal vehicle itself.140 The process is
highly complicated however it is approached, and it needs to
happen remotely, hundreds or thousands of kilometers away
from the surface of the Earth.141
But ADR also presents a highly nuanced political challenge
that hinders its implementation.142 Technologies that are capable of achieving the steps involved in ADR are dual-use, meaning that they could be used as easily for hostile purposes as
peaceful ones.143 While many space (and other) technologies
fall into this dual-use category, ADR technologies are particularly fraught because the activities they necessarily carry out to
remove debris—proximity; rendezvous; grappling; and disposal
of an object that may be minimally characterized, unfamiliar,
and uncooperative—are identical to the potential steps that, in
our view, would likely be involved in the operation of space
weaponry.144
To date, attempts under international law to identify a difference between ADR and weapons systems at a technological level
that can be defined and translated into international regulation
have not been successful.145 Scholars in international law have
noted the tension between the way the Outer Space Treaty privi139 See Leonard David, Space Junk Removal Is Not Going Smoothly, SCI. AM. (Apr.
14, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-junk-removal-isnot-going-smoothly/; see also Handmer, supra note 110, at 73.
140 NASA, STTR 2011 PHASE I SOLICITATION 1 (2011).
141 See J.-C. LIOU, ACTIVE DEBRIS REMOVAL – A GRAND ENGINEERING CHALLENGE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4 (2011), https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/
20110011986.
142 See JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE, SPACE WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ARMING THE
HEAVENS 30–31 (2016); see also Claude R. Phipps, A Laser-Optical System to Re-enter
or Lower Low Earth Orbit Space Debris, 93 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 418, 428 (2014) (discussing the need for international cooperation before a laser-optical system can
be used for space debris removal).
143 See Handmer, supra note 110, at 65; Phipps, supra note 142, at 418, 428;
Jakub Pra_ák, Dual-Use Conundrum: Towards the Weaponization of Outer Space?, 187
ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 397, 397 (2021); Bohumil Dobos̆ & Jakub Pra_ák, To Clear or
to Eliminate? Active Debris Removal Systems as Antisatellite Weapons, 47 SPACE POL’Y
217, 218 (2019).
144 Pra_ák, supra note 143, at 401–02.
145 See, e.g., Anne-Sophie Martin, Opinion, Forty Years of Negotiations on PAROS:
Outcomes and New Challenges, SPACEWATCH GLOB., https://spacewatch.global/
2020/11/spacewatchgl-opinion-forty-years-of-negotiations-on-paros-outcomesand-new-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/TW4P-UDAT].
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leges ideas of “peaceful use” of space and the ubiquity of dualuse technologies,146 which the Treaty and its associated social
structures tries to regulate without doing so explicitly. Some
have gone so far as to classify this tension (and a perceived legal
gap) as a lacuna.147 The core of the challenge is in drawing clear
lines: What is a weapon, and what is not? What is military and
what is civil? What makes a space object “debris?” Without clear
definitions for all of these terms, regulatory efforts have historically stalled and are difficult to revive.
Two examples of this impasse in action are the Prevention of
an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) process,148 which has to
date been unsuccessful in its efforts to define the term “space
weapon,”149 and an attempt by the Space Generation Advisory
Council (SGAC) to assess ADR methods against a scorecard that
incorporated legal, economic, and policy criteria as well as technical viability.150 SGAC was unable to identify a viable ADR option, instead falling back on the need to define “space debris”
itself, among other things.151
Readers might well say, “Of course the issue in both these
cases was not the definition of the technology, but a problem of
politics.” But this is precisely the point; many current legal efforts persist in the belief that if we could only get past the politics, there is some workable definition to be found.152 At the
same time, ADR (and other emerging dual-use space technologies) are indivisibly entangled with social factors—most notably,
geopolitics. It is politics, not technology, that makes an ADR sys146 See, e.g., Christopher Newman, Ralph Dinsley & William Ralston, Introducing
the Law Games: Predicting Legal Liability and Fault in Satellite Operations, 67 ADVANCES SPACE RSCH. 3785, 3787 (2021).
147 See, e.g., Blount, supra note 138, at 180–85.
148 See the numerous United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions,
beginning with Resolution 36/97C, which has been directed towards the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.” G.A. Res. 36/97C (Dec. 9, 1981). Most
recently, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 76/230,
which called on all states, in particular those with major space capabilities, “[t]o
take urgent measures to prevent for all time the placement of weapons in outer
space and the threat or use of force in outer space, from space against Earth and
from Earth against objects in outer space.” G.A. Res. 76/230, art. 3(a) (Dec. 24,
2021).
149 Blount, supra note 138, at 182.
150 Matteo Emanuelli, Giulia Frederico, Joshua Loughman, Deva Prasad, Tiffany Chow & Minoo Rathnasbapathy, Conceptualizing an Economically, Legally, and
Politically Viable Active Debris Removal Option, 104 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 201–02
(2014).
151 Id. at 200.
152 See Blount, supra note 138, at 182.
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tem a weapon. Likewise, it is the result of what is essentially a
political process that any regulatory instrument—whether binding or not—is developed through COPUOS, where decisions
are made by consensus, thus enabling horse trading and compromise to achieve an end result.153
Thus, efforts to strip out politics are, on this view, well-intentioned but at times unlikely to yield useful results. If approaches
that seek to divide categories have proven unsatisfactory, STS
might be a useful resource for sparking more sympathetic ways
of conceptualizing the entanglements of the problem itself, offering new paths towards solutions that incorporate social and
political factors as well as technological and legal ones.154
VI.

DEBRIS REMEDIATION THROUGH RENDEZVOUS
AND PROXIMITY OPERATIONS

Already, international efforts are emerging that attempt to update regulatory frameworks to apply in helpful ways to aspects of
ADR. One such aspect worthy of examination is an early step in
many ADR proposals—Rendezvous and Proximity Operations
(RPOs).155
The ability to get close to an object in orbit (proximity operation)—defined by The Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (CONFERS) as the “[s]eries of
orbital maneuvers executed to place and maintain a spacecraft
in the vicinity of another space object on a relative planned path
for a specific time duration to accomplish mission objectives”156—is an essential step in most activities that have the capacity to improve the sustainability of space activities.157 Onorbit servicing, for example, involves a diagnostic step that may
require imaging or sensing from a proximate location.158
Rendezvous (the act of actually making contact with a space
object) is of significant value for extending the life of existing
Mehak Sarang, Op-Ed, Thoughts on UN COPUOS, SPACE GENERATION ADVICOUNCIL (Aug. 4, 2019), https://spacegeneration.org/oped-thoughts-onun-copuos [https://perma.cc/T5F7-XCML].
154 See generally Handmer, supra note 110, at 137–38 (discussing a detailed empirical study of ADR technology development through an STS lens).
155 See CONSORTIUM FOR EXECUTION OF RENDEZVOUS AND SERVICING OPERATIONS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR COMMERCIAL RENDEZVOUS AND PROXIMITY OPERATIONS (RPO) AND ON-ORBIT SERVICING (OOS) 1–2 (2021).
156 Id. at 2.
157 Id. at 1–2.
158 See id. at 2.
153
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space assets, whether through servicing, refueling, repair, or attachment of additional modules (for example, thrusters).159
RPOs can also be used to characterize, move, or remove debris.160 For commercial entities, the question of “how close is too
close?” is a difficult, but important, one to resolve.
One of the core principles placed on states and outlined in
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty is, as noted above, the obligation to undertake space activities “with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.”161
The same Treaty provision also requires states to “undertake appropriate international consultations” before they conduct any
“activity or experiment” that may “cause potentially harmful interference” with other states’ activities.162 The combination of
these principles is notable in that it prompts states not only to
curtail their activities but also to engage proactively in international discussions. In resolving the question “how close is too
close,” Article IX asks states to consider whether potentially
harmful interference could arise, and if so, to initiate a consultation process.163
In theory, this principle is a failsafe. In practice, it would be
extremely rare for a state to initiate a consultation along these
lines prior to engaging in a space activity. Moreover, the growing number of commercial entities looking to conduct RPOs as
part of their operations (whether they are passing through or
intending to lurk closely to another satellite, or perhaps even
carrying out ADR)164 challenges the effective operation of this
principle. The obligation to conduct consultations rests with the
state, not with the commercial entity.
This is not to say that commercial activities are unregulated—
for example, the Rules to the relevant Australian national space
law require the owner of any payload (who is an Australian national) seeking a permit to “not operate the payload in a manner that causes Australia to be liable for any damage under the
Liability Convention” and to “not operate the payload in a man159 See, e.g., GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CTR., NASA, ON-ORBIT SATELLITE SERVICING
STUDY PROJECT REPORT 70, 87–88 (2010).
160 Id. at 38.
161 See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text; see also Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 3, art. IX.
162 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX.
163 Id.
164 BRUCE MCCLINTOCK, KATIE FIESTEL, DOUGLAS C. LIGOR & KATHRYN
O’CONNOR, RAND CORP., RESPONSIBLE SPACE BEHAVIOR FOR THE NEW SPACE ERA:
PRESERVING THE PROVINCE OF HUMANITY 18 (2021).
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ner that the owner knows, or ought reasonably to know, will
negatively affect the national security of Australia.”165
Arguably representing proxies for “due regard,” these provisions go a long way in our view to strongly encouraging commercial entities to avoid reckless behavior. However, there are some
nuances to the wording. Rather than simply asking applicants to
demonstrate how they will avoid causing damage, Rule
50(1)(j)(iv) asks them to undertake not to cause Australia to be
liable under an international treaty (the Liability Convention),166 arguably passing on responsibility from the state (to
continually supervise) to the commercial entity itself. In other
words, reading the text as written, the implication is that such
causation may be assessed in a context of result, not intention.167
The consequence involves a series of nested binary conditions
that exist in an uncertain future state—should hypothetical
damage occur at any time in the future and should Australia be
found liable under international law (an international state-tostate legal process), the domestic legal question may then hinge
on whether the commercial entity operated the payload in a
manner that caused the liability, not the damage.168 Rule
50(1)(j)(v), on the other hand, leaves the specific range of consequences and actions that may “negatively affect . . . national
security,”169 placing a significant burden on applicants to consider not only technological factors but also political issues. A
significant degree of professional judgement is required on this
point, since the factors that may contribute to a space activity
being viewed as a political threat are many and varied. Importantly, answering “how close is too close” with “caus[ing] Australia to be liable” and possibly “negatively affect[ing] the national
security of Australia” does not provide useful technological parameters for the people making technical decisions—generally
engineers.170
The questions raised here will no doubt be resolved if and
when this part of the law is tested. The point of this analysis is
simply to illustrate the complexities through the example of one
domestic regulatory system in the way that it seeks to address the
165 Space (Launches and Returns) (General) Rules 2019 (Cth) r 50(1)(j)(iv)–(v)
(Austl.).
166 Id. r 50(1)(j)(iv).
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 Id. r 50(1)(j)(v).
170 Id. r 50(1)(j)(iv)–(v).
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distribution of responsibility. Clearly, it is important to provide
clarity for commercial operators to ensure safe and cohesive approaches to emerging and established space activities. This follows from the fact that space in many ways is now playing an
important private role.171 The beginning of the 1990s saw the
commercialization of space expand rapidly.172 Since 1998, the
value of the commercial space sector has exceeded that of the
government space sector.173 The global commercial space economy in 2021 totaled approximately $370 billion174 and is anticipated to grow to between $1–3 trillion by the 2040s.175
The commercialization of outer space is highly significant,
and a growing array of private space actors seek enabling rules
of the space road that would allow them to expand their potential business opportunities with strong government support but
minimal government interference.176 In return, many—but not
all—countries develop their sovereign space capabilities
through partnering with the private sector and by leveraging the
technological advancements of the private sector.177 The public–private relationship in space for those countries is an essential two-way street.
This requires that complex and sometimes competing elements be considered in the ongoing development of regulatory
and governance structures for space at both the international
and national levels. The international law principles are based
on a notion of shared and common interests in space, even going so far as to require, as noted, that space activities are to be
“carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.”178 One overarching theme of this international regime is
that countries are responsible for ensuring that all activities that
171 See Steve Simon, A Cause for Concern: Developing Regulatory Competitions in
NewSpace, 187 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 212, 212 (2021).
172 See Loring Wirbel, The Space Industry: Supporting U.S. Supremacy, INST. FOR
POL’Y STUDS. (Oct. 4, 2005), https://ips-dc.org/the_space_industry_supporting
_us_supremacy/ [https://perma.cc/DH83-PN44].
173 Freeland, supra note 2.
174 Press Release, Euroconsult, Euroconsult Estimates That the Global Space
Economy Totaled $370 Billion in 2021 (Jan. 11, 2022), https://www.euroconsultec.com/press-release/euroconsult-estimates-that-the-global-space-economy-totaled-370-billion-in-2021/ [https://perma.cc/RX4J-G4XZ].
175 See KEITH W. CRANE, EVAN LINCK, BHAVYA LAL & RACHEL Y. WEI, INST. FOR
DEF. ANALYSES, MEASURING THE SPACE ECONOMY: ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN AND FOR SPACE 33, 35 (2020).
176 See Simon, supra note 171, at 218.
177 See id.; Handmer, supra note 110, at 74–76.
178 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. I.
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they and their corporate and private citizens undertake in space
will adhere to the globally accepted principles of law.179
However, one might easily conclude that these foundational
principles are not necessarily always squarely in sync with the
needs of private commercial actors, who operate around a carefully calibrated risk/reward calculation when determining their
investments in space. For companies operating in the space sector, the answers to uncertain questions have real impacts for
whether they can secure a permit, get insurance, and receive
spectrum allocation, in addition to affecting the cost of their
product. Governments therefore need to carefully balance these
competing factors when crafting national space regulations.
They are bound by the important global principles of international space law, but at the same time, some of those governments will also wish to encourage private and commercial
involvement in space, for their own benefit and for the growth
of their industry, domestic economy, inward and outward foreign direct investment, and the enhancement of their strategic
technological competitiveness.
As our analysis demonstrates, law cannot provide certainty
where these and other political, social, and technological questions are so enmeshed. Australia is just one example that illustrates how provisions that seem simple at first glance
incorporate a breadth of political considerations that may impact the development, regulation, and operation of technology.
VII.

EXAMPLE: APPLYING KRANZBERG’S “LAWS”

On the basis of the prior analysis, we now present three distinct types of solutions to the “uncertainty gap” that arises when
non-technical factors take precedence in inherently political decisions about technology.180 These are the following:
1.
2.
3.

The delegation of international obligation to domestic regulatory authorities;
The proliferation of non-governmental entities that provide
transparency to an otherwise opaque area;
The development of industry-led regulatory guidelines.

The first type, the delegation of international obligation to a
government-established regulatory body, includes, for example,
Australia’s launch-permit rules.181 The relevant regulatory
179
180
181

See id. arts. VI–VII.
See generally Kranzberg, supra note 121, at 544–60.
See Space (Launches and Returns) (General) Rules 2019 (Cth) pt 3 (Austl.).
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agency, the Australian Space Agency, has responsibility for enacting the authorization process, which incorporates aspects of
the due regard principle as well as the obligation to carry out
authorization and continuing supervision.182 Another example
is the delegation of responsibility for managing spectrum, which
in Australia falls to the Australian Communications and Media
Authority (ACMA).183 ACMA liaises with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) on behalf of commercial
entities.184
The second type of solution to the “uncertainty gap,” the
proliferation of non-governmental entities that increase transparency by making space activities public, contributes to the
formation of precedent by providing open-source intelligence
and reports. Examples include Gunter’s Space Page,185 Jonathan
McDowell’s General Catalog of Artificial Space Objects and
Space Report,186 and collation products such as Secure World
Foundation’s Global Counterspace Capabilities Report (published annually)187 and CSIS’s Space Threat Assessment.188 The
latter organizations also facilitate informal international discussions, which progress consensus and provide commercial entities with the opportunity to contribute alongside national
representatives.189
182 AUSTL. SPACE AGENCY, ADVANCING SPACE: AUSTRALIAN CIVIL SPACE STRATEGY
2019 – 2028, at 8 (2019); see also Space (Launches and Returns) Act 2018 (Cth)
(Austl.); Space (Launches and Returns) (General) Rules 2019.
183 See Launch or Communicate with a Small Satellite or CubeSat, AUSTL. COMMC’NS
& MEDIA AUTH., https://www.acma.gov.au/launch-or-communicate-small-satellite-or-cubesat [https://perma.cc/QZ3N-SX8F] (Nov. 6, 2019).
184 Id.
185 Gunter D. Krebs, Gunter’s Space Page, https://space.skyrocket.de/index.html [https://perma.cc/U55H-ES87] (Feb. 7, 2022).
186 Jonathan C. McDowell, General Catalog of Artificial Space Objects, https://
planet4589.org/space/gcat [https://perma.cc/FH7S-B6Q6] (June 30, 2022); see
also Jonathan McDowell, Jonathan’s Space Report (June 27, 2022), https://
planet4589.org/jsr.html [https://perma.cc/HQ4V-2DL3] (providing launch information spanning multiple nations).
187 SECURE WORLD FOUND., GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES: AN OPEN
SOURCE ASSESSMENT (Brian Weeden & Victoria Samson eds., 2022), https://
swfound.org/counterspace/ [https://perma.cc/3CXQ-3TXB].
188 TODD HARRISON, KAITLYN JOHNSON, JOE MOYE & MAKENA YOUNG, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT (2021), https://csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210331_Harrison_SpaceThreat
Assessment2021.pdf?gVYhCn79enGCOZtcQnA6MLkeKlcwqqks [https://
perma.cc/P494-6AXV].
189 See, e.g., Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud., Space Security: Issues for the New U.S.
Administration, YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=LFtY2-NKX0E&t=4846s [https://perma.cc/UR83-FNWW].
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The third emerging-solution category concerns the rising interest in and development of industry-led regulatory instruments. In the absence of clear specifications from national
regulators and the presence of non-specific and non-binding international guidelines, big commercial players have begun working together to define their own answers to questions such as
“how close is too close.” One such organization is CONFERS,190
comprising corporate members receiving initial funding from
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in
the United States. Beginning from the presumption that RPO
and On-Orbit Servicing (OOS) activities will occur, CONFERS
aims to coordinate directly between commercial actors to form
accepted norms of behavior and share information.191 In October 2021, CONFERS released its updated Guiding Principles for
Commercial Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) and On-Orbit Servicing (OOS).192 The set of four non-binding guidelines narrows the bounds within which a commercial actor is supposed to
operate,193 in effect forcing the establishment of best practices
by agreement, rather than waiting for precedent.
Given the emerging nature of this category, and the interesting dynamic it adds to the overall space-policy landscape, we
have provided further analysis on these guidelines below.
The first principle is “Consensual Operations”—the document specifies, “RPO for on-orbit services with artificial space
objects will be conducted via commercial agreements between
consenting parties.”194 This principle focuses on behavior rather
than technological capability.
The second principle addresses the regulatory uncertainties
that currently exist in the nexus between international and domestic law, and thereby between domestic law and commercial
entities; the principle states that, in addition to being compliant
with domestic laws of the client space object and servicer, “the
collaborating parties will conduct their operations in full compliance with the [Outer Space Treaty].”195
For background information about CONFERS, see What is CONFERS?, CONEXECUTION OF RENDEZVOUS & SERVICING OPERATIONS, https://
www.satelliteconfers.org/ [https://perma.cc/W4FR-83FB].
191 Id.
192 CONSORTIUM FOR EXECUTION OF RENDEZVOUS & SERVICING OPERATIONS,
supra note 155, at 1.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
190
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The third principle concerns “Responsible Operations” and
specifies a short list of measures that contribute to responsible
practice, including use of “generally accepted engineering practices appropriate to the proposed activity,” debris mitigation, establishment and maintenance of communications during an
operation, and a requirement for insurance to “reasonably cover
the risk of the activity to third parties.”196 Importantly, the list
also includes a common-sense clarification as to what best practices entails, stating that “[b]est practices and standards for commercial servicing will be based upon actual, accumulated
operational experience.”197 Not only does this principle serve to
unshackle commercial operators from limits based on purely
theoretical assessments (at least in an aspirational sense), it also
acknowledges the extent to which RPO activities are still in their
nascent stage.
The final guiding principle is “Transparent Operations.”198
CONFERS proposes that “[p]arties conducting commercial servicing operations will work within the principle of transparency
to promote safety and trust.”199 The guidelines go on to state
that “parties conducting the servicing operation will notify the
relevant State(s) of the general nature, conduct, locations, and
results of servicing operations” and that “[t]he parties conducting the servicing operation will develop and implement a
protocol that provides timely public notification of anomalies or
mishaps that could have an adverse impact on other entities or
the space environment.”200
Inherent within the guidelines is a compromise. In order to
establish best practices and precedent and to improve the environment of “safety and trust,” CONFERS suggests that commercial parties should “look for opportunities to share lessons
learned from operational successes and anomalies while protecting intellectual property and competition-sensitive information,
and complying with export control regulations.”201
However, the most interesting part of the guidelines is the invocation of the due regard principle.202 In addition to stating
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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that all parties should conduct operations in compliance with
the Outer Space Treaty, CONFERS specifies that
[i]n keeping with Article IX and Article XI of the [Outer Space
Treaty], the parties conducting the servicing operation will operate with due regard to other space activities. They will ensure
sufficient communication and coordination with entities that
could reasonably be affected by the servicing operation to support safety and avoid harmful interference.203

CONFERS’s guiding principles are non-binding, but they represent an important bottom-up process by which parties looking to operate in space recognize that in order to manage risk
and ensure ongoing sustainability of operations, there is a
strong incentive to self-regulate.204 Rather than acting as if space
were an unregulated “Wild West,” which would create significant operational risk and increase the likelihood of unsuitable
regulations being hurriedly applied from the top-down at a later
date, companies are also themselves beginning to create instruments and fora through which they can define boundaries and
answer non-technical questions that inform technological decisions. From an academic STS perspective, we feel that approaches such as that taken by CONFERS could offer a rich
opportunity for detailed analysis through contemporary
frameworks such as co-production.205
VIII.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

A variety of technological developments appears to be provoking challenges to the peaceful uses of space, whether they
emerge principally from political, technological, or social isId. at 2. Article XI of the Outer Space Treaty provides as follows:
In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the
United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific
community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the
nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and
effectively.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. XI.
204 See CONSORTIUM FOR EXECUTION OF RENDEZVOUS & SERVICING OPERATIONS,
supra note 155, at 1.
205 See SHEILA JASANOFF, STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 2 (2004).
203
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sues—or, as this Article suggests, from entanglements of all
three factors and perhaps others as well. While we have focused
on debris removal as a way of highlighting some problems (and
possible solutions) for space law associated with ADR and RPO,
we consider there to be many other areas that spark similar concerns for the core principles of due regard, (potentially) harmful interference, and peaceful uses of space. The utility of
autonomous systems and AI in space, for example, is becoming
increasingly evident, and as with ADR and RPO systems, technical measures are less useful for legal questions than they may
have been in the past.206
For space activities in particular, the lack of caselaw to date
makes it hard to assess the impact of emerging challenges because doing so requires combining abstract thinking about principles with uncertain future possibilities. While law will continue
to play a crucial role, lawyers certainly cannot do this on their
own. They simply do not have the tools to do so. All relevant
stakeholders must exchange ideas, knowledge and expertise,
and they must understand how each can contribute. This requires a broad approach to the analysis of how space works.
In such cases, this Article suggests that understanding social
and technological complexities as being interwoven with one another in the formation of emerging challenges may be a more
helpful approach than trying to split problems into technological questions and social questions and dealing with these questions separately. STS offers frameworks that may allow legal
scholars to approach highly networked and entangled questions
in ways that make space amenable to legal analysis while viewing
it as a part of an interdependent—as opposed to independent—
context.
Such approaches take into consideration the complex political history of space activities as well as contemporary commercial, academic, and government practices. While this Article
does not exhaustively examine STS approaches, it suggests several frameworks that could be explored as a starting point for
further discussion. We hope these suggestions prompt thought
among readers from all fields, and look forward to the ongoing
debate directed towards an appropriate future where space continues to play a vital role in the activities of humankind.
206 Anne-Sophie Martin & Steven Freeland, The Advent of Artificial Intelligence in
Space Activities: New Legal Challenges, 55 SPACE POL’Y 1, 2, 4–7 (2021).

